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vs. ) Case No. 18130 
• 
• 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF ) 
UTAH and FRANK L. TILT, • • 
Father of JEFFREY MATTHEW ) 
TILT, Deceased. • • ) 
Defendants. • • 
__________ _, _____________________________ _ 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
The Plaintiff, J & W Janitorial Service, was found to 
be liable for death benefits as a result of the work-related 
accident which resulted in the death of Jeffrey M. Tilt, age 
18, on the 9th day of May, 1981. 
DISPOSITION BY THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
An order was made by the administrative law judge, 
and affirmed by the Industrial Commission, that Jeffrey M. Tilt 
was an employee of the Plaintiff and that deceased "was killed 
while in the course and scope of his employment with J & w 
Janitorial." 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Plaintiff in this action operated a business to 
provide janitorial services to companies in Salt Lake City. 
The Plaintiff operated under the name of J & w Janitorial 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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service, a sole proprietorship owned by Mr. and Mrs. Jerry 
Johnson. 
For reasons attributed to necessity in obtaining a 
business license, and to avoid liability and payment of taxes, 
Plaintiff did not have workmen's compensation insurance, nor 
did he make any deductions from "employees'" wages for taxes. 
R. 49-50. 
One of Plaintiff's janitorial accounts was Sorority 
Food, a bakery located at 443 West Fourth North. Three of 
Plaintiff's employees would clean the bakery each night. They 
would arrive about 7:00 p.m. and work until about 1:30 or 2:00 
a.m. and "go home earlier or later" depending on when they came 
and when they completed their work. R. 48. 
There was a qu~stion as to whether there was 
supervision and the three witnesses all gave different answers 
on who was foreman and in charge. R. 48, 64, 72, 74. Besides 
the deceased, the other two working the night of the accident 
were Carry Dannenberg, brother-in-law to the owner, R. 62, and 
Trevor Hilderbrant. Dannenberg was phoned by Mr. Johnson's 
father and told to get someone to help that night as Glen (the 
father) would not be at the bakery. Dannenberg, it seems, 
contacted Jeff Tilt and picked up Tilt and Hilderbrant at the 
home of Hilderbrant. The three cleaned the bakery the night of 
May 9, 1981. During what seems to be horseplay by the three 
employees, an accident occurred when Tilt was in the large 
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dough mixer and Hilderbrant pushed the button that actuated the 
mixer after Tilt had said something like 0 open the door." R. 
61. 
Dannenberg asked Tilt to work that night. He took 
Tilt to work and presumably would have driven Hilderbrant and 
Tilt to the Salt Palace as Hilderbrant was going to purchase 
concert tickets. R. 67. And the reason Dannenberg gave for 
staying "after work" was to wait for the beer to "get cold in 
the freezer." R. 59. 
The only witness to the accident, and the only people 
in the building at the time, other than deceased, were 
Dannenberg, the brother-in-law of the owner and Hilderbrant, 
the one who pushed the wrong button which caused the tragic 
accident. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: THE FINDING BY THE INDUSTRIAL 
COMMISSION THAT THE ACCIDENT WAS IN THE 
COURSE AND SCOPE OF HIS EMPLOYMENT 
MUST BE AFFIRMED ON APPEAL 
As stated in ~aiser Steel Corp. v. Manfredi, and 
reaffirmed in Sabo's Electronic Service v. Sabo, and in 
Kinchele v. State Insurance Fund, #17624, filed November s, 
1982, the scope of review in Industrial Commission cases is 
limited to: 
[W]hether the Commission's findings are 
•arbitrary or capricious,• or •wholly without 
cause" or contrary to the "one [inevitable] 
conclusion from the evidence" or without •any 
substantial evidence" to support them. 
- 3 -
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Only then should the Commission's findings 
be displaced. 
And in cases involving the question of "in the course 
of employment" this court has consistently held that where the 
evidence is conflicting: 
[a]s to whether accident arose out of or in the 
course of the employee's employment, finding of 
commission will not be reviewed on appeal. 
Commercial Casualty Insurance Co. v. Industrial 
Comm., 71 Utah 395, 266 P. 721; Norris v. 
Industrial Comm., 90 Utah 256, 61 P.2d 413; West 
v. Industrial Comm., 90 Utah 262, 61 P.2d 418. 
After a reading of the transcript of the hearing it 
is most plain that the testimony of the Plaintiff owner and his 
two employees was entirely self-serving and such evidence is 
neither competent nor credible. 
POINT II: EMPLOYEE'S ACCIDENT AND DEATH AROSE 
OUT OF OR IN THE COURSE OF HIS EMPLOYMENT 
A. The Utah Statute Encompasses 
the Facts of this Case. 
Utah Code.Ann. §35-1-45 (1953) reads: 
Compensation for industrial accidents to be 
paid--Every employee mentioned in section 
35-1-43 who is injured, and the dependents of 
every such employee who is killed, by accident 
arising out of or in the course of his employ-
ment, wheresoever such injury occurred, provided 
the same was not purposely self-inflicted, shall 
be entitled to receive, and shall be paid, such 
compensation for loss sustained on account of 
such injury or death, and such amount for medi-
cal, nurse and hospital services and medicines, 
and, in case of death, such amount of funeral 
expenses, as herein provided. 
The usual statute reads "arising out of and in the 
course of employment. Both factors are necessary for 
- 4 -
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
compensation to be paid in those 42 states with that language, 
Larson's Law of Workmen's Compensation, Section 6.20. Larson 
notes that Utah is the only state which uses the more broad 
language of "arising out of or in the course of employment." 
This court has stated that this difference in the 
utah statute, which was changed from and to or in 1919, is the 
reason why cases cited from other jurisdictions often have no 
application under our statute. M & K Corp. v. Ind. Comm., 189 
P.2d 132. 
When the legislature in 1919 amended the 
original act, which contained the conjunctive 
"and," and substituted the disjunctive "or,• it 
intended to give the statute the effect stated. 
Tavey v. Industrial Comm., 106 Utah 489, 150 
P.2d 379. 
B. Deviation from Regular Work may 
be fn the "Course of Employment.• 
This case is another example of the foreseeable 
actions of young men in which this court has ruled that the 
employee has not departed from the course of his employment. 
In Twin Peaks Canning Co. v. Ind. Comm., 57 Utah 589, 196 P. 
853, this court held, as defined in M & K Corp., supra: 
In the case of Twin Peaks Canning Co. v. 
Industrial Commission, supra, a boy who was 
employed by the Canning Company while the 
machinery was stopped and he had nothing else to 
do, took an elevator, which he had been 
forbidden to use, on to a floor where his duties 
did not require him to go and there, while 
engaged in some horseplay, which was of no 
benefit to his employer, was accidently killed. 
We held that he had not departed from the course 
of his employment on the ground that what he was 
doing was what could be expected under the 
- 5 -
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circumstances and it was therefore incidental to 
his work. 
There the employee at the time of the ~~ 
accident was not doing anything which his 
emp1oyment required him to do or which had any 
tendency to benefit his employer. He engaged in 
some horseplay which involved the use of an 
elevator some distance from his work which he 
was forbidden to use, at a time when there was 
no work for him to do. Such activities were the 
sole cause of his death. 
In the present case three young men, 18 and 19 years 
of age, are left to themselves to clean a bakery. With fork 
lifts and machinery at hand horseplay is the inevitable. 
Larsen says in Sec. 23.65: 
If the primary test in horseplay cases is 
deviation from the employment, the question 
whether the horseplay involved the dropping of 
active duties calling for claimant's attention 
as distinguished from the mere killing of time 
while claimant had nothing to do assumes 
considerable importance. There are two reasons 
for this: first, if there were no duties to be 
per~ormed, there were none to be abandoned; and 
second, it is common knowledge, embodied in more 
than one old saw, that idleness breeds mischief, 
so that if idleness is a fixture of the 
employment, its handmaiden mischief is also. 
Most cases now give considerable weight to 
this factor in dealing with participants in 
horseplay. They recognized that workmen whose 
jobs call for vigorous physical activity cannot 
be expected, during idle periods, to wit with 
folded hands in an attitude of contemplation. 
They must do something, and the most natural 
thing in the world to do is to joke, scuffle, 
spar, and play with the equipment and apparatus 
of the plant. 
Larsen in Sec. 23.42 cites the case of Peet v. Gardner Oil, 492 
S.W.2d 103 (Missouri): 
- 6 -
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Peet v.Gardner Oil Co., 492 s.w. 2d 103 
(Mo.App. I973). craimant, a 17-year-old boy, 
worked in the employer's filling station under 
the supervision of another 17-year-old, D.S. 
While in the process of closing the station for 
the night, D.S. threw a sponge at claimant; 
claimant fell over a bucket; claimant picked up 
a bucket and chased D.S.; D.S. closed a door to 
bar claimant; and claimant tripped, with his arm 
going through a glass panel. The Court of 
Appeals held the resulting injuries compensable, 
stressing the inevitability of some horseplay 
when two 17-year-olds are left alone. 
c. After Working Hours 
Appellant goes to considerable length to argue that 
the time between the conclusion of cleaning the bakery and the 
time of the accident was of such duration to take the employee 
out of the "course of employment." For the following reasons 
the Industrial Commission correctly ruled that the employee was 
in the course of his employment at the time of the accident: 
1. The employee was injured on the premises where 
the work is to be performd. In Edwards v. Ind. Comm., 48 P.2d 
459, this Court held that the test of whether an employee was 
in the course of his employment is: 
Ordinarily where an employee is present at 
the place of work, even though he has not 
started work but is there to begin work or is 
there on the premises on his way to perform his 
duties, the accident is compensable. This is on 
the theory that the course of his employment 
must start somewhere. When he arrives at the 
place of work, even though he has not started 
his work, the course of his employment begins. 
On the other hand, it is a general rule that no 
compensation is recoverable by an employee who 
is injured while off the premises on his way to 
or from his work. 
- 7 -
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It is true that this case deals with where work had 
not yet started. However, the principle should be the same 
where the employee was on the premises because work had just 
been completed. 
2. The testimony is not to be relied upon as to 
when work was completed and when injury occurred. 
3. The employee was on the premises because he was 
brought there by the employer, or his agents, and would leave 
when his employer, or agents, wanted to leave. 
4. Testimony was conflicting and the witnesses were 
led into testimony that would show a lapse of time between the 
job completion and the accident. 
Counsel suggested employees stayed at the bakery to 
keep warm. R. 69. And the employee, Dannenberg, said the 
reason they stayed at the bakery was "we were waiting for the 
beer to get cold in the freezer." 
The picture that is seen of what was happening that 
/ 
May night is not entirely clear but some of the impressions are 
very vivid. 
Three young men, friends for many years, were 
employed to clean the bakery. They had only their own 
supervision and the environment was conclusive to having fun. 
It appears that they brought beer with them and consumed some 
during the night. Other than the horseplay and a clogged drain 
we know little of the work activity. The only two witnesses to 
the accident testified that the work had been completed. But 
- 8 -
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